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We examine global economic dynamics under infinite-horizon learning in a New 
Keynesian model in which the interest-rate rule is subject to the zero lower bound. 
As in Evans, Guse and Honkapohja, European Economic Review (2008), we find 
that under normal monetary and fiscal policy the intended steady state is locally 
but not globally stable. Unstable deflationary paths can arise after large 
pessimistic shocks to expectations. For large expectation shocks that push interest 
rates to the zero lower bound, temporary increases in government spending can 
effectively insulate the economy from deflation traps. 
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Odotukset, deflaatioansat ja talouspolitiikka 
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Tässä työssä tarkastellaan talouden dynaamista tasapainottumista adaptiivisten 
odotusten uuskeynesiläisessä makromallissa, jossa taloustoimijoiden ennuste-
horisontti on ääretön ja jossa rahapolitiikan ohjauskorko voi ajautua alarajalleen. 
Tämän tutkimuksen tulokset ovat Evansin, Gusen ja Honkapohjan aikaisempien 
tulosten (European Economic Review, 2008) mukaisia siinä mielessä, että tavan-
omaisin raha- ja finanssipoliittisin keinoin ylläpidetty talouden pitkän aikavälin 
tasapaino on paikallisesti stabiili eli talous palautuu tasapainoonsa pienten häiriöi-
den jälkeen. Tällainen tasapaino on kuitenkin globaalisti hauras, eikä epävakaiden 
deflaatiokierteiden syntymistä voida tavanomaisin raha- ja finanssipoliittisin kei-
noin estää. Suuret, odotuksia synkistävät häiriöt voivat johtaa itseään toteuttavaan 
deflaatiokierteeseen, jonka vuoksi talous uhkaa ajautua nollakorkotasapainoon. 
Julkisten menojen väliaikaista kasvattamista voidaan käyttää eristämään talous 
tällaisilta deflaatioansoilta. 
 
Avainsanat: adaptiiviset odotukset, rahapolitiikka, finanssipolitiikka, nimellis-
koron nollaraja 
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Following the introduction of inﬂation targeting and related monetary
strategies, target inﬂation rates seem to have fallen to relatively low levels,
about two to three percent in many countries. This implies that large adverse
shocks might push the economy into periods of deﬂation. This was clearly a
major concern in the US during the 2001 recession. The experiences of 2008
and 2009, as well as the earlier experience of Japan since the 1990s, have
underscored these concerns and created a situation in which the monetary
policy response is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates, a phenomenon sometimes called a ‘liquidity trap.’ Furthermore, in
al i q u i d i t yt r a pt h e r ei st h ep o t e n t i a lf o rt h ee c o n o m yt og e ts t u c ki na
deﬂationary situation with declining or persistently low levels of output.
The theoretical plausibility of the economy becoming trapped in a
deﬂationary state, and the macroeconomic policies that might be able to
avoid or extricate the economy from a liquidity trap, have been examined
predominantly from the rational expectations (RE) perspective. One central
feature of this literature emphasizes the role of commitment. For example,
Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argue that if the
economy encounters a liquidity trap, monetary policy should commit to being
expansionary for a considerable period of time, by keeping interest rates
near zero even after the economy has emerged from deﬂation. Another issue
concerns the possibility of permanent deﬂation. Under RE this hinges on the
precise form of ﬁscal policy in the deﬂationary steady state and on whether
this is consistent with the household’s transversality condition. See Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2002)
and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). A further issue is the impact of the
interest rate zero lower bound on the performance of policies during the
transition back to the inﬂation target.1
In our opinion, the RE assumption is questionable in an episode of deﬂation,
which is far away from the inﬂation target and the normal state of the
economy, and presents a new environment for economic agents. Our own view,
reﬂected in Evans and Honkapohja (2005) and Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja
(2008), is that the evolution of expectations plays a key role in the dynamics
of the economy and that the tools from learning theory are needed for a
realistic analysis of these issues. As we will see, there is the possibility of
a self-reinforcing feedback loop, in which suﬃciently pessimistic expectations
result in low output and deﬂation, leading to high real interest rates because
of the zero lower bound, which in turn results in a downward revision of
expectations, strengthening the downward pressure on output and deﬂation.
More speciﬁcally, under learning private agents are assumed to form
expectations using an adaptive forecasting rule, which they update over time
in accordance with standard statistical procedures. The analysis of Evans,
Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) was conducted in a standard New Keynesian
model with sticky prices using the assumption that the decisions of private
1See Adam and Billi (2007) and Coenen, Orphanides, and Wieland (2004) for
representative recent analyses and further references.
7agents are based on short-horizon rules. These rules are based on the
agents’ Euler equations, specifying the optimal trade-oﬀ between current and
anticipated next period decisions. These anticipations in turn are formed
using subjective expectations based on forecasting models which are updated
over time using recursive estimation procedures. This framework, often called
‘Euler-equation learning,’ yielded important results about formulating robust
policies to combat deﬂationary outcomes. However, its short decision horizon
means that one cannot study the implications for current behaviour of explicit
commitment to future policies. In particular, this learning framework cannot
be used to assess the conventional wisdom of the RE literature that an
appropriate policy to combat a deﬂation episode is a commitment to low
interest rates for a sustained period in the future.
In this paper we replace Euler-equation learning with the assumption
that agents have inﬁnite-horizon decision rules derived from intertemporal
optimisation under given paths of expectations of aggregate economic
variables. This type of formulation is often called ‘inﬁnite-horizon learning’
and it has recently been emphasized by Preston (2005) and Preston (2006).2
In general, in this setting the individual consumers need to forecast interest
rates, inﬂation, income and taxes over the inﬁnite future. As a benchmark,
we also assume in this paper that the consumers are fully Ricardian and
incorporate the government’s intertemporal budget constraint into their own
lifetime budget constraint. This last assumption means that the consumption
function depends on expected future real interest rates and incomes net of
government spending. In this formulation the mix of government ﬁnancing
does not inﬂuence private consumption behaviour.
The possibility of deﬂation traps under a standard forward-looking global
Taylor rule emerges as a serious concern. Although the targeted steady state
is locally stable under learning, a large pessimistic shock to expectations can
result, under learning, in a self-reinforcing deﬂationary process accompanied
by declining output. Our results under learning are in stark contrast to what is
possible under RE. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001) showed that
under perfect foresight, in addition to the targeted steady state, there are
nonlinear paths that converge to an unintended low-inﬂation steady state.3
Thus the learning dynamics under standard monetary and ﬁscal policy are
even more disturbing than those under RE.
We next consider monetary and ﬁscal policies that have been suggested to
combat the possibility of deﬂation. One case is aggressive monetary easing
in which the Taylor rule is overridden by dropping the interest rate to (very
near) zero whenever expected inﬂation falls below a speciﬁed threshold. In our
inﬁnite-horizon set-up agents are assumed to understand that this aggressive
policy will be in place throughout the future. Strikingly, this policy, although
it does oﬀer some protection, is not suﬃcient to eliminate the possibility of
deﬂation traps if the negative expectations shock is very large. In fact, even
2The formulation has earlier been used in Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans,
Honkapohja, and Romer (1998). Other recent papers include Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra
(2009) and Eusepi and Preston (2007).
3The low steady state can be one of either low positive inﬂation or deﬂation, depending
on the details of the interest rate rule.
8if the monetary authorities commit to zero interest rates forever, regardless of
the state of the economy, the possibility of a deﬂation trap remains (although
the likelihood is reduced).
These results raise the question of whether there exists a policy that ensures
that the economy will never get trapped into a deﬂationary process and will
converge to the targeted steady state. We focus on the policy recommended in
Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008). Under this policy aggressive monetary
easing is augmented by aggressive ﬁscal easing when required to keep inﬂation
at or above the threshold. This policy always eliminates the possibility of
deﬂationary spirals and ensures global stability of the targeted steady state.
2T h e m o d e l
We start with the same economic framework as in Evans, Guse, and
Honkapohja (2008). There is a continuum of household-ﬁrms, which
produce a diﬀerentiated consumption good under monopolistic competition
and price-adjustment costs. There is also a government which uses both
monetary and ﬁscal policy and can issue public debt as described below.
The objective for agent s is to maximise expected, discounted utility subject
























where ct,s is the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption aggregator, Mt,s and mt,s denote
nominal and real money balances, ht,s is the labour input into production,
bt,s denotes the real quantity of risk-free one-period nominal bonds held by
t h ea g e n ta tt h ee n do fp e r i o dt, Υt,s is the lump-sum tax collected by the
government, Rt−1 is the nominal interest rate factor between periods t−1 and
t, Pt,s is the price of consumption good s, yt,s is output of good s, Pt is the
aggregate price level and the inﬂation rate is πt = Pt/Pt−1. The subjective


























where σ1,σ2,ε,γ > 0.T h e ﬁnal term parameterises the cost of adjusting
prices in the spirit of Rotemberg (1982).4 The household decision problem is
also subject to the usual ‘no Ponzi game’ condition.




4We use the Rotemberg formulation in preference to the Calvo model of price stickiness
because it enables us to study global dynamics in the nonlinear system. The linearisations
at the targeted steady state are identical for the two approaches.
9where 0 <α<1. Output is diﬀerentiated and ﬁrms operate under








Here Pt,s is the proﬁt maximising price set by ﬁrm s consistent with its
production yt,s. The parameter ν is the elasticity of substitution between
two goods and is assumed to be greater than one. Yt is aggregate output,
which is exogenous to the ﬁrm.
The government’s ﬂow budget constraint is





where gt denotes government consumption of the aggregate good, bt is the real
quantity of government debt, and Υt is the real lump-sum tax collected. We
assume that ﬁscal policy follows a linear tax rule for lump-sum taxes as in
Leeper (1991)
Υt = κ0 + κbt−1 + ηt (2.5)
where ηt is a white noise shock and where β
−1 − 1 <κ<1. The restriction
on κ means that ﬁscal policy is ‘passive’ in the terminology of Leeper (1991),
and implies that an increase in real government debt leads to an increase
in taxes suﬃcient to cover the increased interest and at least some fraction
of the increased principal. In a companion paper we plan to investigate the
implications of ‘active’ ﬁscal policy in which 0 ≤ κ<β
−1 − 1.
We assume that gt is stochastic:
gt =¯ g + ut (2.6)
where ut is an observable, stationary, AR(1) mean zero shock. From market
clearing we have
ct + gt = yt (2.7)








The function f(π) is taken to be positive and non-decreasing, while θt is an
exogenous, observable, stationary, AR(1) positive random shock with mean
1 representing random shifts in the behaviour of the monetary policy-maker.
The rule (2.8) is a nonlinear forward-looking Taylor rule, in which dependence
on output expectations is suppressed for simplicity.5 We assume the existence
of π∗,R ∗ such that R∗ = β
−1π∗ and f(π∗)=R∗ − 1. π∗ c a nb ev i e w e da st h e
5The main results below would also hold in the case of a contemporaneous-data Taylor
rule, which is used in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008).
10inﬂation target of the Central Bank, and we will assume that π∗ ≥ 1.I nt h e






which implies the existence of a nonstochastic steady state at π∗.N o t e t h a t
f0(π∗)=AR∗, which we assume is bigger than β
−1. Equations (2.4), (2.5) and
(2.8) constitute ‘normal policy.’
2.1 Optimal decisions for private sector

























































where πt+1,s = Pt+1,s/Pt,s. We now make use of the representative agent
assumption. In the representative-agent economy all agents s have the same
utility functions, initial money and debt holdings and prices. We assume also
that they make the same forecasts Et,sct+1,s Et,sπt+1,s, Et,sπt+1,a sw e l la s
forecasts of other variables that will become relevant below. Under these
assumptions all agents make the same decisions at each point in time, so that
ht,s = ht, yt,s = yt, ct,s = ct and πt,s = πt, and all agents make the same
forecasts. Imposing also the equilibrium condition Yt = yt = hα

















































For convenience, we make the assumptions σ1 = σ2 =1 , ie utility of
consumption and of money is logarithmic. It is also assumed that agents have
point expectations, so that their decisions depend only on the mean of their
subjective forecasts. This is a satisfactory assumption provided the shocks are
suﬃciently small. This allows us to write the system as
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Equation (2.12) is the nonlinear New Keynesian Phillips curve, which describes
the optimal price-setting by ﬁrms. The term (πt − 1)πt arises from the
quadratic form of the adjustment costs, and this expression is increasing
in πt over the allowable range πt ≥ 1/2. To interpret this equation, note
that the bracketed expression in the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the
diﬀerence between the marginal disutility of labour and the product of the
marginal revenue from an extra unit of labour with the marginal utility of
consumption. The terms involving current and future inﬂation arise from the
price-adjustment costs resulting from marginal variations in labour supply.
Equation (2.11) is the standard Euler equation giving the intertemporal
ﬁrst-order condition for the consumption path. Equation (2.10) is the money
demand function resulting from the presence of real balances in the utility
function. Note that for our parameterisation, the demand for real balances
becomes inﬁnite as Rt → 1.
We now proceed to rewrite the decision rules for ct and πt so that they
depend on forecasts of key variables over the inﬁnite horizon.
2.2 The inﬁnite-horizon Phillips curve
W es t a r tw i t ha ni n ﬁnite-horizon version of the Phillips curve (2.12). Let
Qt =( πt − 1)πt (2.13)
The appropriate root for given Q is π ≥ 1
2 a n ds ow en e e dt oi m p o s eQ ≥− 1
4 to
have a meaningful model. Making use of the aggregate relationships ht = y
1/α
t










































t+j denotes expected net output, which equals expectations of yt+j−gt+j.
The expectations are formed at time t and variables at time t are assumed to be
in the information set of the agents. We will treat (2.14), together with (2.13),





In the Phillips curve relationship (2.14) one might wonder why inﬂation
does not also depend directly on the expected future aggregate inﬂation
12rate.6 Equation (2.9) is obtained from the ﬁrst-order conditions using (2.3)
to eliminate relative prices. Because of the representative agent assumption,
each ﬁrm’s output equals average output in every period. Since ﬁrms can be
assumed to have learned this is the case, we obtain (2.14). An alternative
procedure would be to start from (2.9), iterate it forward and use the demand
function to write the third term on the right-hand side of (2.9) in terms of
the relative price. This would lead to a modiﬁcation of (2.14) in which future
relative prices also appear, but using the representative agent assumption, the
relative price term would drop out.
2.3 The consumption function
To derive the consumption function from (2.11) we use the ﬂow budget
constraint and the NPG (no Ponzi game) condition to obtain an intertemporal
budget constraint. Write
bt = rtbt−1 + Φt
where rt = Rt−1/πt and
Φt = yt + mt−1π
−1
t − ct − mt − Υt (2.15)
Note that we assume (Pjt/Pt)yjt = yt, ie the representative agent assumption







we obtain the life-time budget constraint of the household





































Here all expectations are formed in period t, which is indicated in the notation
for De
t,t+j but is omitted from the other expectational variables.







6There is an indirect eﬀect of expected inﬂation on current inﬂation via current output.
13Substituting this expression for ce















φt = yt + mt−1π
−1















A crucial issue is how households form expectations of future taxes. In this
paper we make the strong Ricardian equivalence assumption that households
understand that the government’s intertemporal budget constraint will be
satisﬁed.7 First, write down the latter constraint. From (2.4) one has
bt + mt + Υt = gt + mt−1π
−1
t + rtbt−1 or
bt = ∆t + rtbt−1 where
∆t = gt − Υt − mt + mt−1π
−1
t
By forward substitution, and assuming limT→∞ Dt,t+Tbt+T =0 ,






Note that ∆t+j is the primary government deﬁcit in t + j,m e a s u r e da s
government purchases less lump-sum taxes and less seigniorage. Under the
Ricardian Equivalence assumption, we assume that agents at each time t
expect this constraint to be satisﬁed, ie






















−1 for j =1 ,2,3,...
Substituting out rtbt−1 from (2.19) and rearranging we get
(1 − β)














ct =( 1− β)
Ã











Equation (2.21) is viewed as the temporary equilibrium equation that, under
Ricardian Equivalence, determines consumption, given expectations. In the
7Relaxing this assumption would be of interest. This would require agents to forecast
future taxes and the evolution of public debt. For a simple example of this approach see
Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009).





j=1 using an adaptive learning rule that treats these aggregates as an
exogenously given process. For the consumption function (2.21) one needs





Various assumptions are natural, but we will focus on the assumption that re
t+i
is obtained from separate forecasts of inﬂation and interest rates, making use
of the monetary policy rule to forecast the latter. Thus, monetary policy is
both transparent and credible in that agents incorporate the interest rate rule




















We remark that our consumption function (2.21) exhibits Ricardian
Equivalence in the following sense:
Proposition 2.1 Household consumption depends on the sequence of expected
government spending but not in any way on how it is ﬁnanced.
This temporary equilibrium result for arbitrary subjective expectations
generalizes the results of Wallace (1981) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003),
which presume that the RE hypothesis holds. The assumption of Ricardian
consumers has, in particular, the implication that an open-market operation
altering the initial composition of wealth between money and bonds has no
eﬀect on consumption, given subsequent interest rate policy and the sequence
of government spending. In addition, the standard result about the neutrality
of changes in lump-sum taxes holds in our setting.
3 Learning and stability of steady states
Consider ﬁrst the steady states of the model. These are found by setting
the random shocks to zero and setting πe
t+j = πt = π, ye
t+j = yt = y,a n d
xe
t+j = ye
t+j − ¯ g = y − ¯ g. For any steady state π, equation (2.11) implies that
the nominal interest rate factor satisﬁes the Fisher equation
R = β
−1π (3.1)
As emphasised by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001), because f(.)
is nonnegative, continuous (and diﬀerentiable) and has a steady state π∗ with
f0(π∗) >β
−1, there must be a second steady state πL <π ∗ with f0(πL) <β
−1.
For our parameterisation of f(·), there are no steady states other than the
intended steady state π∗ and the unintended low-inﬂation steady state πL.
8Alternatively, if the policy rule is not known to the agents, one could assume that agents
forecast future real interest rates directly using an adaptive learning rule. The local stability







Policy rule for R
Fisher equation
Figure 1: Multiple steady states under normal policy
Figure 1 illustrates the two steady states resulting from the global Taylor rule
subject to the zero lower bound on net interest rates.9
The other steady-state equations are given by
c = h














and a steady-state version of (2.10). It is shown in the Appendix of Evans,
Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) that in most cases there is a corresponding
unique interior steady state c>0 and h>0.
The starting point in the learning approach to expectations formation is
that economic agents have very limited knowledge about the structure of the
economy, so that they do not have RE and instead make inference about the
relevant parts of the economy that they need for forecasting. The agents make
forecasts using a reduced-form econometric model of the relevant variables
and using parameters that are estimated using past data. The forecasts are
input to agent’s decision rules and in each period the economy attains a
9We remark that it follows from Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001) and Evans,
Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) that π∗ is locally determinate and πL is locally indeterminate
under RE.
16temporary equilibrium, ie an equilibrium for the current period variables given
the forecasts of the agents. See eg Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Sargent
(2008) and Evans and Honkapohja (2009) for general discussions of adaptive
learning.
The temporary equilibrium provides a new data point, which in the next
period leads to re-estimation of the parameters and updating of the forecasts
and, in turn, to a new temporary equilibrium. The sequence of temporary
equilibria may generate parameter estimates that converge to a ﬁxed point
corresponding to an RE equilibrium for the economy. When the convergence
takes place, we say that the RE equilibrium is stable under learning. In the
general formulation of the model given above, it was assumed that the economy
is subject to stationary autoregressive random shocks. If these exogenous
shocks are observable, then agents would naturally include them in their
forecasting model, and the coeﬃcients of the model would be estimated and
updated by an econometric technique such as recursive least squares. If the
exogenous shocks are iid then they provide no information about their future
values and thus would be excluded from the forecasting model. In this case
agents would simply estimate the intercept for each variable. If these estimates
converge over time to ﬁxed values, the limit corresponds to an RE stochastic
steady state. In the current model there are two possible RE stochastic steady
states. When the random shocks are small these are close to the nonstochastic
steady states discussed above.
The simple set-up just described, in which only intercepts are estimated, is
referred to as ‘steady-state learning.’ More speciﬁcally, steady-state learning















t−1 + ωt(zt−1 − z
e
t−1) (3.4)
for z = y,π.H e r e ωt is called the ‘gain sequence,’ and measures the extent
of adjustment of estimates to the most recent forecast error. In stochastic
systems one often sets ωt = t−1 and this ‘decreasing gain’ learning corresponds
to least-squares updating. Also widely used is the case ωt = ω,f o r0 <ω≤
1, called ‘constant gain’ learning. In this case it is usually assumed that ω
is small. Stability of the steady states is examined below using the simple
learning rules just described. Thus the exogenous random shocks are assumed
to be iid. T h i si sm e r e l yas i m p l i ﬁcation since it can be shown that the
stability of the steady states is governed by the stability of the estimates of
the intercepts. Furthermore, it can also be shown that provided the iid shocks
are suﬃciently small, the stability properties of steady states are the same
as for the corresponding nonstochastic system. Thus, for simplicity, in what
follows the exogenous shocks θt,u t,ηt are assumed to be constants, equal to
their respective mean values, and we study steady state learning within the
nonstochastic system.
173.1 Temporary equilibrium
Collecting the preceding, the following equations deﬁne the temporary
























t+j − ¯ g
¶
Qt =( πt − 1)πt
2) Consumption function
ct =( 1 − β)
Ã

























4) Government budget constraint























j=1, the above six equations deﬁne the
temporary equilibrium in ct,π t,y t,R t,m t,b t. The model dynamics are then
completed by specifying the evolution of expectations over time in accordance
with the learning rules described above. The dynamics under learning can
be conveniently described by using the close connection between the possible
convergence of least-squares learning to an RE equilibrium and a stability
condition, known as E-stability. E-stability of an equilibrium is based on a
mapping from the perceived law of motion that private agents are estimating
and using to make forecasts to the implied actual law of motion generating
the data (ie the temporary equilibrium) under these perceptions. E-stability
is deﬁned in terms of local stability, at an RE equilibrium, of a diﬀerential
18equation based on this map. For a general discussion of adaptive learning and
the E-stability principle see Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
Before turning to the E-stability results, we brieﬂy discuss the issue of
the transversality conditions in our temporary equilibrium set-up. Under
steady-state learning, πe
t+j = πe







j , where re
t =( 1+f(πe
t))/πe
t is the expected real
interest factor, and the consumption function takes the form
ct =( 1− β)
µ










t > 1.10 The consumption function gives the time t choice of
consumption based on information and forecasts at time t,a n dc a nb ev i e w e d
as the ﬁr s ts t e po fa ni n ﬁnite-horizon dynamic plan. From the consumption
Euler equation it follows that the expected path of future consumption (with









t ,f o rj =1 ,2,3,...
where here c
−1
t+j is the expected marginal utility of money at t+j.T h er e l e v a n t







holds along the planned path of consumption and bonds. Because the
consumption function is derived using the intertemporal budget constraint



















t bt+j, it follows that (3.6) is satisﬁed along the planned path.11 Thus,
at each point in time, the transversality condition is met for the households’
planned path of consumption and wealth.
3.2 E-stability
The theoretical results for learning below are based on E-stability analysis of
the system under the learning rules (3.4). It can be shown that a steady state
is locally stable under learning for decreasing or small constant gains if and
only if it is E-stable.12 The deﬁnition of E-stability for the case at hand is
given below.
10See the discussion below for our treatment of the case re
t ≤ 1.




along the planned path.
12See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Evans and Honkapohja (2009) for general
discussions of E-stability. Sections 3.3—3.4, 7.2 and chapter 11 of Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) discuss the special case of steady-state learning.
19We now proceed to the analysis of E-stability of the two possible steady
states when the global interest rate rule (2.8) describes monetary policy. Using
(3.5) and market clearing,
yt =¯ g +( β
−1 − 1)(y
e
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By construction, the steady states are the ﬁx e dp o i n t so ft h i ss y s t e mo f
diﬀerential equations. A steady state is said to be E-stable if it is locally
stable under (3.10). The diﬀerential equations operate in ‘notional’ or ‘virtual’
t i m e . I tc a nb es h o w nt h a tf o rl a r g ev a l u e so ft h e( d i s c r e t e )r e a lt i m et, the
continuous time paths (ye(τ),π e(τ)) of (3.10) are approximately related to the
discrete-time trajectories (ye
t,π e
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Starting with function G2,t a k ed i ﬀerentials
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−1 − 1)(¯ y − ¯ g)
µ
1+f(¯ π) − ¯ πf0(¯ π)
(1 + f(¯ π) − ¯ π)2
¶
Here 1+f(¯ π)− ¯ πf0(¯ π)=( β
−1 −f0(¯ π))¯ π, which is negative at π∗ and positive
at πL.T h u s ,
DπeG1 < 0 at π
∗ and > 0 at πL
For the sign of DπeG2 we have
sgn[DπeG2]=sgn[DπeG1]













The (2,2) element is DπeG2 − 1 and for suﬃciently small γD πeG2 becomes
large (see the expression for Ky), so the element is positive for small γ which
implies E-instability of πL.
Collecting the results:
Proposition 3.1 The model with normal policy has two steady state states
π∗ and πL.U n d e r i n ﬁnite-horizon decision rules with learning the targeted
steady state π∗ i sl o c a l l ys t a b l eu n d e rl e a r n i n g . F o rγ suﬃciently small the
low-inﬂation steady state is locally unstable and takes the form of a saddle
point.
For global results we turn to numerical analysis. One technical issue has to
be taken care of in connection with steady state learning by households. With
an arbitrary value of inﬂation expectations, there are regions of the space of
expectations in which the expected real interest rate and thus 1+f(πe
t)−πe
t can
be negative. This would imply inﬁnite consumption in the preceding formula
for the consumption function. To avoid this diﬃculty, truncate the steady-state
expectations of the household at some long but ﬁnite horizon T and postulate
that beyond the horizon, agents just assume that the real rate of interest has
21reached its steady state value β
−1. With this assumption the consumption
function becomes
ct =( 1− β)
"
yt − ¯ g +( y
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In the global analysis one must also make sure that π ≥ 1/2.T h i si sa c h i e v e di n
the numerics by setting π =1 /2 if the other temporary equilibrium equations
would imply Q<−1
4.
Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical results in Proposition 3.1. The
parameter values A =2 .5, π∗ =1 .02, β =0 .99, α =0 .75, β =2 0 , ν =1 .5,
ε =1 , R∗ = π∗/β, ¯ g =0 .1 and T =5 0are used. The ﬁgure shows the phase
diagram of the system (3.10) for the evolution of expectations under learning.
Given expectations dynamics, it is easy to compute the trajectories of actual
inﬂation and output.








E-stability dynamics under global Taylor rule
Figure 2 shows the global E-stability dynamics that provide an
approximation to the real-time dynamics of learning. On examining the
aggregate demand equation (3.7), it is seen that the locus consisting of the two
vertical lines gives values for (πe,y e) at which
dye
dτ =0 , while the upward-sloping
curve gives values for (πe,y e) at which dπe
dτ =0 . The targeted steady state at
π∗ =1 .02 is locally stable under E-stability dynamics and convergence toward
it is cyclical. The low steady state πL =0 .993092, yL =0 .633614 is a saddle
22point and, most importantly, there is a region of initial expectations implying
unstable trajectories with falling inﬂation expectations and eventually falling
output expectations. The same holds true for actual inﬂation and output.
We call these paths deﬂationary spirals and this region the deﬂationary trap.
The downward-sloping line through the low steady state gives the local linear
approximation of the stable manifold separating the basin of attraction of the
targeted steady state from the deﬂationary region.
Figure 2 shows that the problem of deﬂationary traps for suﬃciently
pessimistic expectations, discovered in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008)
for Euler equation learning, continues to arise under inﬁnite-horizon learning,
in which consumption, output and inﬂation are determined as the ﬁrst-period
decisions of the solution to the inﬁnite-horizon optimisation problem under
subjective expectations based on our learning rule. The intuition for the
unstable trajectories is that suﬃciently pessimistic expectations πe
t,y e
t lead
to high expected real interest rates, because of the zero lower bound on net
nominal interest rates. High expected real interest rates and low expected
incomes, imply lower inﬂation and output through the consumption function
and the inﬁnite-horizon Phillips curve. The learning rule can then lead to
a downward revision of expectations over time, pushing the economy further
along an unstable trajectory. Of course, along an unstable path one would
expect either private agents or policymakers eventually to alter their actions,
but our results nonetheless indicate the potential for major disruptions to the
economy resulting from large negative shocks to expectations. We now turn
to possible policy changes that can avoid these undesirable outcomes.
4 Alternative monetary and ﬁscal policies
4.1 Monetary policy committing to low interest rates
In earlier work with Eran Guse, published as Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja
(2008), we considered the implications of aggressive monetary easing triggered
by inﬂation rates below some threshold ˜ π,w h e r eπL < ˜ π<π ∗.T h a t p a p e r
studied Euler-equation learning in which agents have short horizons, and it
was found that this type of policy did not provide a fool-proof way to avoid
deﬂationary spirals. In the current framework agents have long horizons in
their decision-making, so that there appears to be more scope for aggressive
monetary policy to eliminate these unstable trajectories. Furthermore, in
models with RE commitment to long periods of low interest rates has been
advocated as a way to avoid the consequences of liquidity traps, see eg
Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and Svensson (2003).
W em o d i f yt h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l et oi n c l u d ea g g r e s s i v em o n e t a r ye a s i n gi f
expected inﬂation gets too low. This idea is formalised by introducing a lower
threshold for inﬂation, so that the interest rate Rt is cut to a low level ˆ R very
close to one. To maintain continuity of the interest rate rule, one introduces






f(πe) if πe > ˜ π2
ˆ R +( πe − ˜ π1)
f(˜ π2)− ˆ R
˜ π2−˜ π1 if ˜ π1 ≤ πe ≤ ˜ π2
ˆ R if πe < ˜ π1
(4.1)
so that f(πe) in the earlier rule (2.8) is replaced by ˜ f(πe).
Figure 3 illustrates the expectation dynamics with aggressive monetary
easing. The numerics set ˜ π1 =1 .009 and ˜ π2 =1 .01, so that the interest rate
is adjusted linearly down to R =1 .001 ≡ ˆ R. The other parameter values are
unchanged. It is evident that the possibility of deﬂationary spirals remains.
The new policy does help a little bit because it shifts the unstable region
south-west, as is evident from comparing Figures 2 and 3. The constrained
l o ws t e a d y - s t a t ev a l u e si nF i g u r e3a r eπL =0 .99099, yL =0 .633459,w h i c ha r e
lower than the values of the low-inﬂation steady state in Figure 2. Our main
point is that adding aggressive monetary easing at low (expected) inﬂation
r a t e si sn o ts u ﬃcient to eliminate the region of deﬂation traps.








Global expectations dynamics with aggressive monetary easing
In Figure 3 it is assumed that agents have incorporated the interest rate
rule in their consumption function and thus they are assumed to know that
aggressive monetary easing will be continued as long as inﬂation expectations
remain low. We now take up the possibility that the central bank commits
to zero interest rates for an extended period of time that continues even if
inﬂation expectations increase toward the targeted value. This is investigated
in our learning setup by considering the limit case in which policy makers
24respond to low inﬂation by committing to the zero interest-rate policy forever.
Surprisingly, the possibility of deﬂation traps remains even in this extreme
case of monetary easing forever. This result is illustrated in Figure 4.









Dynamics with aggressive monetary easing forever
It can be seen that, for suﬃciently pessimistic expectations, the region of
deﬂation traps continues to exist. This policy reduces the deﬂationary region
somewhat but at the great cost of converting the previous region of stability
into a regime in which inﬂation would increase without bound.
4.2 Combined monetary and ﬁscal easing
We now add aggressive ﬁscal policy to the preceding monetary easing
policy, following Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008). The key idea is to
temporarily increase government spending to ensure that inﬂation never falls
below a suitable threshold. With changes in government spending, agents
now have to forecast both gross and net output, which implies that the
expectation dynamics become three-dimensional and phase diagrams cannot
be conveniently used to illustrate the dynamics. Instead, selected time paths
of central variables are plotted in the next two ﬁgures. The formal changes to
t h em o d e la r ea sf o l l o w s .
25First, assume that expectations of net output are determined by
steady-state learning as was earlier done for output and inﬂation. Thus, in
addition to (3.4) the expectation dynamics for xe





t−1 + ωt(xt−1 − x
e
t−1)
The temporary equilibrium equations are now given by the following. Gross
output is13


















Net output is given by
xt = yt − gt (4.4)
Evidently, for given expectations net output is independent of gt,s ot h a ti n
temporary equilibrium the government spending multiplier is one. Inﬂation is
determined by


































T h e s ee q u a t i o n sa r eag e n e r a lisation of (3.8)—(3.9).14
The policy of ﬁscal easing is begun as triggered by actual inﬂation
threatening to fall below the threshold ˜ π1 speciﬁed in the modiﬁcation to the
interest rate rule in equation (4.1) in the preceding section. Speciﬁcally, it is
assumed that if πt < ˜ π1 at gt =¯ g then government spending is increased to
whatever level is needed to ensure πt =˜ π1. This is feasible because of the
following Lemma:







for some k>0 and gt suﬃciently large.
Proof. As net output is constant, we have
dyt
dgt =1 . Then, it is seen from
(4.5)—(4.6) that
∂Q
∂yt is bounded above zero for yt suﬃciently large and so the
same holds for ∂πt
∂yt.
13It should be noted that this equation holds only if (1 + ˜ f(πe
t))/πe
t > 1 and this issue
was dealt with by the truncation of the consumption function in the numerical analysis as
explained earlier.
14As mentioned earlier, these equations hold provided that Q(πt) > −1
4 a n di nt h i sc a s e
πt is taken as the upper root of the quadratic. For Q(πt) ≤− 1
4 we set πt = 1
2.
26The Lemma implies that under our policy of combined ﬁscal and monetary
easing triggered by the inﬂation threshold, inﬂation will never fall below ˜ π1.
We remark that this result holds regardless of the elasticity of labour supply,
which is parameterised by ε>0.I fε is large, so that labour supply is highly
inelastic, then the sensitivity of inﬂation to output in the Phillips curve is
correspondingly higher.
The lemma implies the following global uniqueness result:
Proposition 4.2 Consider the temporary equilibrium system (4.1), (4.2),
(4.3), (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6) with ﬁscal easing triggered by the threshold ˜ π1.
There is a unique steady state with inﬂation at π∗ and a corresponding value for
output, with gt =¯ g. The targeted steady state is locally stable under learning.
Proof. From (4.2)—(4.3) in a steady state we obtain the Fisher equation
R = β
−1π. The interest rate rule provides a second steady-state relationship
R =1+˜ f(π). These equations have a unique solution at π∗under the speciﬁed
policy since the policy implies the restriction π ≥ ˜ π1. Local stability under
learning follows from Proposition 3.1.
The numerical results indicate that the steady state is globally stable under
learning.
The results are illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. Consider a starting point
πe =0 .995, ye =0 .62 and xe =0 .52, which is picked from the deﬂationary
region in Figure 3. Figure 5 shows the time paths for expectations of inﬂation,
output and net output. The ordering of the time paths from top to bottom is
πe, ye and xe. While there are initial ﬂuctuations in these expectations, the
time paths converge to the targeted steady state over time. Figure 6 shows the
corresponding dynamics of actual inﬂation, output and government spending.
T h eo r d e r i n go fc u r v e sf r o mt o pd o w no nt h er i g h ti sπ, y and g. It is seen
that actual values of inﬂation and the output variables also converge to their
steady state values after initial ﬂuctuations. We remark that the time variable
plotted here is notional time τ corresponding to the E-stability diﬀerential
equation. For constant gains the link to real time t depends on the ‘gain’ ω
of the learning rule according to τ = ωt.T h u s i f ω =0 .10 per quarter then
τ =2corresponds to t =2 0quarters.
It evident that there is convergence to the unique steady state and this
result appears to be robust numerically. Thus, this policy appears to provide
a robust way to avoid a liquidity trap and the associated deﬂationary dynamics
that arise with learning under the basic interest rate policy. The mechanism
is that by stabilising prices through expansionary government spending, low
nominal interest rates yield low expected real interest rates, which leads to a
recovery of private spending.









Figure 2: Inﬂation, output, and net output expectations over time, with
combined monetary and ﬁscal easing in response to large pessimistic shock
While our recommended policy does successfully insulate the economy from
the deﬂation trap, the resulting path is cyclical and exhibits overshooting of
the inﬂation target after the economy is pushed out of the deﬂationary region.
There are big ﬂuctuations in inﬂation, output and government spending in the
initial stages of the dynamics, a feature that was not seen in the short-horizon
learning examined in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008). The reason for
the large ﬂuctuations is as follows. The combined monetary and ﬁscal easing
during the initial period of pessimistic expectations leads to high levels of
government spending and output, which in turn substantially increases ye.
When the initial period of easing ends at around τ =0 .1, πe is near the
threshold value ˜ π1,b u tye is above the value corresponding to the targeted
steady state. For a period of time gt remains at the normal value ¯ g and
Figure 2 applies. It can be seen that the economy is in a region northwest of
the targeted steady state, implying that πe and ye increase. Eventually the
economy enters a region northeast of the π∗ steady state, with increasing πe
and decreasing ye. The next phase is in the region southeast of the π∗ steady
state, with decreasing πe and ye. This is followed by a phase in the region
southwest of the π∗ steady state, and a second time interval during which
aggressive ﬁscal policy is followed before gradual convergence to the targeted
steady state. This particular simulation shows that the cyclical adjustment
path to the targeted steady state can entail more than one time interval during
which the thresholds for aggressive policy are binding.
These numerical results raise the question of whether alternative versions
of our combined policy of monetary and ﬁscal easing can insulate the economy
from deﬂation traps with smaller ﬂuctuations in output and inﬂation. In
Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) interest rates responded to current
rather than expected inﬂation, and it is possible this would improve
performance under inﬁnite-horizon learning. One related issue to examine
is the performance of interest-rate rules that additionally depend on actual











Figure 3: Time paths of actual inﬂation, output, and government spending,
with combined monetary and ﬁscal easing in response to large pessimistic
shock.
or expected output (or net output). Based on the steady-state relationship
between output and inﬂation, these more general Taylor rules are unlikely to
change the number of steady states, and hence will not eliminate deﬂation
traps, but they may improve the cyclical performance of the economy. Other
possible modiﬁcations of policy include ﬁscal responses that are smoother and
that respond countercyclically to high expected output and inﬂation, and
explicit commitments to temporary increases in government spending with
a suitable time proﬁle.
The time-path of public debt is an important feature not shown in Figures
5 and 6. The large increases in government spending in the early periods
obviously lead to a substantial increase in public debt. However, because
gt eventually converges to ¯ g and because the tax rule (2.5) is passive in
the sense of Leeper (1991), the debt level eventually returns to the normal
steady state value. In the case of Euler equation learning this was illustrated
in the numerical simulations of Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008). An
implication of the result that the debt level stabilises in the long run is that
the transversality condition holds ex post as well as ex ante.
Noting the critical role of ﬁscal policy in stabilising inﬂation, one might
ask whether we could dispense entirely with aggressive monetary policy and
simply resort to aggressive ﬁscal policy whenever πt threatens to fall below
˜ π1? While the answer is yes, we think our combined policy is clearly preferable
because there are good reasons to treat monetary policy as the primary tool
for counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy. If extensive government spending
is used to guarantee the inﬂation threshold, then it is likely that much of the
spending will be wasteful in the sense that private consumption would be more
highly valued. We therefore prefer to use ﬁscal policy as a policy of last resort
to ensure the inﬂation threshold.
295C o n c l u s i o n s
When monetary policy is conducted using a standard Taylor rule, the intended
steady state is locally stable under learning. However, the economy is not
globally stable under learning, and this remains true even if agents make
decisions based on inﬁnite-horizon optimisation problems. A large exogenous
negative shock to expectations can lead to a deﬂation trap in which expected
deﬂation and low output is reinforced under learning and the economy fails
to return to the intended equilibrium. Deﬂation traps can be avoided by a
policy of aggressive monetary and ﬁscal easing if inﬂation falls below a suitable
threshold, such as zero net inﬂation. Interestingly, current monetary and ﬁscal
policies to combat the ongoing global economic crisis are qualitatively in line
with the aggressive policies discussed in this paper.
The policy of combined monetary and ﬁscal easing is eﬀective in avoiding
deﬂation even though households are assumed to make consumption decisions
using a perceived life-time budget constraint that incorporates Ricardian
equivalence. Although our suggested policy successfully insulates the economy
against deﬂation traps, in some cases there are substantial ﬂuctuations in
output and inﬂation along the transition back to the intended steady state.
As brieﬂy discussed above, ﬁnding simple policies that reduce the ﬂuctuations
in output and inﬂation, during this transition, is a high priority for future
research.
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